



IAEA

Atoms for Peace and Development

Board of Governors

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Item 6(f) of the adopted agenda
(GOV/2025/36)

NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Resolution adopted on 12 June 2025 during the 1769th session

The Board of Governors,

- (a) Commending the continued professional, independent and impartial efforts of the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat, including its inspectors, to implement Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve the long outstanding Safeguards issues in Iran,
- (b) Emphasizing the essential and independent role of the IAEA in verifying Iran's compliance with its NPT Safeguards obligations,
- (c) Stressing the imperative nature of Iran's compliance with its Safeguards obligations and the importance of Iran cooperating fully and in a timely manner with the Agency with a view to clarifying and resolving the long outstanding Safeguards issues detailed in the Director General's report GOV/2025/25 and in several prior reports,
- (d) Recalling the Board of Governors' resolutions of 19 June 2020 contained in GOV/2020/34, of 8 June 2022 contained in GOV/2022/34, of 17 November 2022 contained in GOV/2022/70, of 5 June 2024 contained in GOV/2024/39, and of 21 November 2024 contained in GOV/2024/68, which called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and decided that it is essential and urgent, in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material, that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding issues, take all specified actions without delay,
- (e) Regretting that despite the above resolutions by the Board and numerous opportunities provided by the Director General since 2019, Iran has failed to provide the co-operation required under its Safeguards Agreement, impeding Agency verification activities, sanitizing locations, and repeatedly failing to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran or information on the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment,

instead stating, inconsistent with the Agency's findings, that it has declared all nuclear material and activities required under its Safeguards Agreement,

(f) Noting the Director General's conclusion contained in GOV/2025/25 that Iran did not declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three undeclared locations in Iran, specifically, Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Turqzabad, and that, because of the lack of technically credible answers by Iran, the Agency is not in a position to determine whether the nuclear material at these undeclared locations in Iran has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of Safeguards,

(g) Noting with concern the Agency's conclusion that these undeclared locations were part of an undeclared, structured programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s, and that some of these activities used undeclared nuclear material,

(h) Noting with concern the Agency's conclusion that Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turqzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location, the whereabouts of which remain unknown,

(i) Noting the Director General's conclusion in GOV/2025/25 that the material balance of the uranium involved in undeclared uranium metal production experiments conducted at Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories (JHL) in 1995–2000 includes an amount of nuclear material still unaccounted for, and that the Agency is not in a position to determine whether this material has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of Safeguards,

(j) Recalling Iran's continued refusal to implement modified Code 3.1, contrary to the legal obligations that it had accepted in 2003 and which it cannot modify or suspend unilaterally in accordance with Article 39 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and Iran's failure to provide the Agency with design and preliminary design information regarding new and planned nuclear facilities, as required under modified Code 3.1, which obstructs the Agency's visibility of Safeguards relevant activities and thereby undermines the effective implementation of Safeguards,

(k) Noting that Iran's failure on numerous occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of Safeguards, while pursuing activities consistent with concealment efforts, including extensive sanitization and the provision of inaccurate explanations, represents a significant impediment to the Agency's ability to clarify and verify Iran's declarations and the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,

(l) Noting with concern the Director General's conclusion, most recently in GOV/2025/25, that these issues stem from Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving the outstanding issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful,

(m) Noting, in this context, the Director General's serious concern regarding the rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only State without nuclear weapons that is producing such material, which the Director General notes the Agency cannot ignore given the potential proliferation implications,

(n) Regretting Iran's failure to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations regarding undeclared nuclear material, despite the Director General's ongoing efforts to obtain progress from Iran on resolving outstanding Safeguards issues and improving cooperation with the Agency, including through the high-level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran in April 2025 and the full implementation of the Joint Statement between the IAEA and Iran of 4

March 2023, recalling that both sides have recognized that such engagements could pave the way for wider agreements among parties,

(o) Reiterating its concern that Iran has still not provided necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency and has not taken the essential and urgent actions as decided by the Board in its June and November 2024 resolutions, with the consequence that Safeguards issues remain outstanding despite numerous interactions with the Agency since 2019, with serious implications for the Agency's ability to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and

(p) Concerned that the Agency is at an impasse with regards to resolving these issues,

1. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board and many opportunities offered, Iran has failed to co-operate fully with the Agency, as required by its Safeguards Agreement;

2. Strongly supports the Agency and requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement fully the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran as well as this and previous resolutions and to report any significant developments to the Board, as appropriate;

3. Finds that Iran's many failures to uphold its obligations since 2019 to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25 constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;

4. Finds also consistent with Article 19 of Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/214, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

5. Finds also that the Director General's inability, as indicated in GOV/2025/25, to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful gives rise to questions that are within the competence of the United Nations Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, consistent with Article III.B.4 of the Agency's Statute, and expresses its grave concern in this regard;

6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his GOV/2025/25. The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute and also provided for in Article 19 of Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and the notification required under Article III.B.4 of the Agency's Statute;

7. Reaffirms its decision that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding Safeguards issues, take the following actions without delay:

i. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran,

ii. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,

iii. Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose, and

- iv. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency;
8. Underscores Iran's legal obligation to implement modified Code 3.1, and provide all necessary design and preliminary design information to the Agency;
9. Underlines that the provision by Iran of this information and access and the subsequent verification by the IAEA pursuant to Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement is essential for the Secretariat to be in position to report the issues as no longer outstanding and thereby remove the need for the Board's consideration and action on these issues;
10. Calls upon Iran to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, so that the Director General can provide the necessary assurances regarding the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement;
11. Stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to the problems posed by the Iranian nuclear programme, including the talks between the United States and Iran, leading to an agreement that addresses all international concerns related to Iran's nuclear activities, encouraging all parties to constructively engage in diplomacy;
12. Decides to make the text of this resolution as well as the Director General's reports on this issue available to the public; and
13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.